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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
-

STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L.
WINDER. JOHN MC HUGH. BRUCE

1 Alh8 61 rQk@
1

1

BLICK, NEIL MILLER and JOHN X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

/I/

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

v

1

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTIN
JUDICIAL NOTICE

I

3TION FOR

i

Supreme Court Docket No. 34485-2007
Twin Falls County District Court No
04-6336

1

December 23,2008, requesting this Court for an order to take judicial notice of the documents request!
therein for the reason that issues have developed in the instant appeal regarding the significance a1
admissibility of the Order of Condemnation and whether the Sharp case is controlling on those issuc
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, a
hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the documents listed below
Supreme Court Docket No. 26237, Ada County Hzghway Dzstrict v. Sharp, copies of which are attack
to this Motion, and shall be placed into the augmentation record in the above entitled appeal:
1. Ver~fiedComplaint with attachments, file stamped March 6, 1997; and

2

Brief in Supp rt of Appellant's Petition for Review, file stamped May 22,2001.

DATED this

8! day of January 2009.
1

For the Supreme Co~ut

-

St€:phen W. Ken)

cc:

Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - Docket No. 34485-2007

I

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L.
WINDER, JOI3N MC HUGH, BRUCE
SWEENEY, MONTE C. MC CLURE, GARY
BLICK, NEIL MILLER and J O I m X COMBO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,

)
)

1
)

il

)
)

Plaintifs-Appellants,

1
)
)
)

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSI-IIP,
Defendant-Respondent.

1

Defendant.

j

,ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Supreme Court Docket No. 34485-2007
Twin Falls County District Court No.
04-6336

A MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on
December 23,2008, requesting this Court for an order to take judicial notice of the documents requested
therein for the reason that issues have developed in the instant appeal regarding the significance and
admissibility of the Order of Condemnation and whether the Sharp case is controlling on those issues.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION FOR SUDICIAL NOTICE be, and
hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall talce JUDICIAL NOTICE of the documents listed below in
Supreme Court Docket No. 26237, Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, copies of which are attached
to this Motion, and shall be placed into the augmentation record in the above entitled appeal:
1. Verified Complaint with attachments, file stamped March 6, 1997; and
of Appellant's Petition for Review, file stamped May 22,2001

DATED this

day of January 2009.
For the Supreme Court.

%qh

Peclp

Stephen W. Kenyon, Cll'erlc
cc:

Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - Docket NO. 34485-2007
-

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
CHRIS KRONBERG
KARL D. VOGT
Deputy Attorneys General
Idaho Transportation Department
33 11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498
ISB #4151
ISB #5015
Counsel for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel.,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Appellant,

)

1
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 34485
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

1
-VS-

CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH,
rNC.
Respondents.

1

1

1
1
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Twin Falls County.
I-Ionorable Judge Nathan Higer presiding.
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to
Rule 201, I.R.E., hereby asks this Court to take judicial notice of the record in Ada County

Iiighway District v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d 1225 (Ct.App. 2001), Docket No. 26237, for
the reason that issues have developed in the instant case regarding the significance and

issues.

Specifically, the State has appealed the admissibility at trial of the Order of

Condemnation and its use as a basis for a jury instruction based on the holding of Sharp.
Respondent Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership (Canyon Vista) has responded that Sharp
is inapposite because the facts of Sharp are different in that the complaint in Sharp was silent on
the issue of access rights, and that there was a conflict between the order of condemnation and
complaint in Sharp. In doing so, Canyon Vista has injected into this matter the precise nature of
the complaint and order of condemnation in Sharp.
The decision in Sharp does not provide sufficient detail to address the assertion by
Canyon Vista that the complaint was silent on the issue of the condemnation of access rights or
whether the complaint conflicted with the order of condemnation. Therefore, the State would
like this Court to review certain documents, specifically the Verified Complaint and the Brief in
Support of Appellant's Petition for Review, in order to address those issues. The State believes
it is of significance that counsel for Canyon Vista was also counsel for Sharp, so that arguments
made by counsel on these issues in Sharp are relevant to the arguments being made by counsel in
the instant appeal regarding whether there was conflict between the complaint and order of
condemnation in Sharp.
This Court has taken judicial notice of its own files and records in at least one other case.
See, State v. Tisdel, 98 Idaho 551, 552, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1977). The court of appeals has
taken judicial notice of the record in a case separate from the one it was reviewing on appeal in
order to determine evidence of legislative intent. See, Knopp v. Nelson, 116 Idaho 343, 345,775
P.2d 657,659 (Ct.App. 1989). Rule 201, I.R.E., permits a court to take judicial notice of its own
records in the same or a separate case, and such judicial notice can occur at any point in the
proceedings.

MOTION FOR JUDICIAL, NOTICE - 2

The documents that the State requests that this Court take judicial notice of are the
Verified Complaint and the Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Review from the Sharp
records. Those two documents are attached hereto.
Respecthlly submitted this 23rdday of December 2008.

CHRIS KRONBERG
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of December, 2008, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
E Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701

movernight Mail
[Zl~elecopy(Fax) - 386-9428

John Lezamiz
133 Shoshone St N
PO Box 389
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0389

m a i l
m ~ a n Delivered
d
movernight Mail
m ~ e l e c o ~(Fax)
y 208-734-4 1 15

MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 3

Kimbell D. Gourley
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLVEEN, Chartered
300 North Sixth Street
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, ldaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8535

Attorneys for: Ada County Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, )
a body politic corporate
)
of the State of Idaho,
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

SHARON L. SHARP,

c v BC

9f0.11488

Case No.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Fee: $67.00

1
)

Defendant.

1

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway District, a body politic
corporate of the state of ldaho ("ACHD"), by and through its counsel of record, Eberle,
Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and as and for a claim against the
Defendants, complains and alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff, ACHD, is a body politic corporate of the state of ldaho, duly and

legally organized and created pursuant to, and by virtue of, the laws of the state of

4%

VERIFIED COMPLAINT -1-

Idaho, and exercising its powers by and through its duly elected, qualified and acting
commissioners, Sherry R. Huber, Susan S. Eastlake, and Gary E. Richardson.
2.

The Defendant, Sharon L. Sharp, is an individual who at all times relevant

hereto resided in Eagle, ldaho ("Sharp"), and who also owns an undivided interest in
that certain real property located at 127 North Eagle Road, Eagle, ldaho 8361 6, which
is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Property").

3.

ACMD, by this action, seeks to (i) take and condemn a portion of the

Property for right-of-way, and (ii) obtain a permanent easement on an additional
portion of the Property, for a public purpose, namely, the alignment, reconstruction,
and widening of the North Eagle Road from the Eagle By-Pass to State Street, ACHD
Project No. 52056.0 (the "Construction Project").

4.

The above entitled court has jurisdiction and venue over this action

pursuant to ldaho Code 57-706.

CLAIM FOR EMINENT DOMAIN O N PROP=

5.

ACHD has, pursuant to the laws of the state of Idaho, including, but not

limited to, ldaho Code 57-701, the power of eminent domain.
6.

On or about February 19, 1997, the ACHD Board of Commissioners

entered an order of condemnation in relation to a portion of Property, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
7.

That the Defendant Sharp, is the owner, or the reputed owner of the

Property.

8.

That ACHD seeks to take, condemn, and obtain in fee title only a portion

of the Property belonging to the Defendant Sharp, which portion of land consists of

VERLFIED COMPLAINT -2-

approximately .00238acres, or I00 square feet, more or less, and is more particularly
described on Exhibit A - I attached hereto (the "Right-of-way Property").

9.

ACHD further seeks to take and obtain a permanent easement on a

portion of the Property belonging to the Defendant Sharp, which portion of land
consists of:

(i)

approximately .0433 acres, or 1,888square feet, more or less,
and is more particularly described on Exhibit "A-2" attached
hereto;

(ii)

approximately .0107acres, or 466 square feet, more or less, and
is more particularly described on Exhibit

'wattached hereto

(collectively the "Permanent Easement Property).

10. A map of the Construction Project showing the location of Right-of-way
Property, and Permanent Easment Property, and the beginning and ending termini of
the Construction Project is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", and, by this reference,
made a part hereof as if set out in full.

11. That the taking of the Right-of-way Property and Permanent Easement
Property is necessary for public use as part of the Construction Project, which has
been and is located in a manner that is most compatible with the general public good,
and causes the least private injury, and such taking is authorized by law.
12.

That ACHD has employed the appraisal services of David M. Ambrose,

MAI, doing business as Ambrose Appraisal Company, to perform an appraisal upon
Right-of-way Property and Permanent Easement Property, and Mr. Ambrose has
placed a fair market value on:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 3 -

(a)

the Right-of-way Property in the total sum of $700 based upon a square
footage of 100 square feet and a fair market value per square foot of
$7.00;

(b)

the Permanent Easement Property in the total sum of $12,970 based
upon the following:
(i)

a square footage of 1,888 square feet and a fair market value per
square foot of $7.00 times 75% for a total sum of $9,912;

(ii)

a square footage of 466 square feet and a fair market value per
square foot of $7.00 times 7 5 % for a total sum of $3,058;

(c)

improvements taken in the condemnation in the total sum of $1,110.

13.

ACHD has sought in good faith t o purchase from Defendant sharp the

Right-of-way Property and the Permanent Easement Property, for the purpose
aforesaid.

Defendant Sharp has refused, and continues t o refuse, to grant said

property t o ACHD for the proposed public use, and the Defendant Sharp has refused,
and still refuses, to negotiate with ACHD for the fair market value of said property.
ACHD has been unable to make any reasonable bargain therefor or to negotiate with
Defendant Sharp for the said property or the damages, if any, resulting from the said
property being taken from the Property.
14.

On or about February 25, 1997, ACHD extended an offer to Defendant

Sharp to purchase the Right-of-way Property, Permanent Easement Property, and the
improvements taken thereon, for their fair market value in the sum of $14,780, plus
a $1,478 premium, for a total sum of $16,258, and Defendant Sharp apparently
rejected the same by failing to respond. A true and correct copy of said purchase offer

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 4 -

is attached hereto as Exhibit "D", and, by this reference, incorporated herein as
though set forth in full.
15.

That ACHD has had to employ Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &

McKlveen, Chartered, t o prosecute this action on its behalf, and ACHD is entitled to
a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of $2,500 if judgment is entered by default,
and such other sums as the court deems reasonable i f the matter is contested.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, the Ada County Highway District, prays forjudgment
against the Defendant as follows:
A.

That the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway District shall be entitled to

judgment condemning the Right-of-way Property, and Permanent Easement Property,
for the said public use;
B.

That just compensation for the taking be ascertained and awarded to

Defendant i n the order of priority that the court determines is just and equitable;
C.

That Ada County Highway District be entitled to attorney's fees and

costs as permitted pursuant to ldaho Code 57-71 8 and such other statutes as may be
applicable including, but not limited to, ldaho Code § 12-120 and ldaho Code § 12-121.

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED
A

Kimbell [I. ourl lev^
Attorney for Plaintiff
.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 5 -

_J'

(9

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)

: ss.

County of Ada

)

RAY PUTMAN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a Right-of-way Specialist for the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway
District, in the above-entitled matter; that he has read the above and foregoing verified

+

complaint, knows the contents thereof, and that the statements contained therein are
true t o the best: of his information, knowledge and belief.

Ra h t m a n

SU.B,SCRiBEDAND SWORN t o before me this
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VERIFIED COMPLAINT -6-

Commission expires: - ( 11(
2-99

LEGAL DESCRIPTION

,continued)

FILE NO:

40187

P

RANGE 1 EAST, B.M., EAGLE, ADA COUNTY, IDAHO ANE BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT MARKING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 8; THENCS
NORTH 6 6 7 . 1 1 FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 8 TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 8 1
DEGREES 5 5 ' 0 0 " WEST 3 3 . 3 3 FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCX,
SAID POINT BEING THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE ALONG SAID NORTHERLY BANK OF THS
DRAINAGE DITCEITHE FOLLOWING COURSES AND DISTANCES: SOUTH 8 1 DEGREES 5 5 ' 0 0 " WEST 7 4 . 6 8
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 5 7 DEGREES 5 5 ' 0 0 " WEST 8 6 . 0 0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 32 DEGREES 5 7 ' 0 0 " WEST
4 8 . 7 0 FEET; THENCE LEAVING SAID B V K OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 4 DEGREES 0 3 ' 2 8 " WEST
1 0 3 . 4 4 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1 DEGREES 1 0 ' 1 0 " WEST 1 5 8 . 6 8 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH
BOUNDARY OF AIKEN'S SECOND ADDITION TO EAGLE, AS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF TI-IE ADA
COUNTY RECORDER, BOISE, IDAHO; THENCE ALONG SAID SOUTH BOUNUARY OF AIKEN'S ADDITION XORTH
9 0 DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 " EAST 1 8 3 . 8 5 FEET TO A POINT ON THE WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLE
RD.; THENCE ALONG SAID WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 " WEST 1 6 4 . 7 8 FEET TO
THE POINT OF BEGINNING
ALSO
A TRACT OF LAND BEING A PORTION OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 , TOWNSHIP 4 NORTK,
RANGE 1 EAST, B.M., EAGLE, ADA COUNTY, IDAHO AND BEING MORE PARTICULURLY DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT MARKING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 8; THENC3
NORTH 5 6 7 . 2 0 FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 8 TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 8 8
DEGREES 3 8 ' 3 1 " WEST 3 3 . 0 1 FEET TO A POINT ON THE WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLZ
RD., SAID POINT BEING THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE CONTINUING SOUTH 8 8 DEGRXES
3 8 ' 3 1 " WEST 1 3 5 . 9 3 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH; THENCS
ALONG SAID SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 5 2 DEGREES 2 5 ' 0 0 " EAST 7 3 . 2 0 FZET;
THENCE CONTINUING ALONG ALONG SAID SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 7 0 DEG2ESS
0 0 ' 0 0 " EAST 8 2 . 8 8 FEET TO A POINT ON THE SAID WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLE ?J.;
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 " WEST 6 9 . 7 7 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY LINE TO THE PODT OF
BEGINNING, TOGETHER WITH .4LL WATER, DITCH AND LATERAL RIGHTS THEREON, INCLUDING SHARZS OR
PORTIONS OF SHARE IN THE NEW DRY CREEK DITCH COMPANY, REPRESENTING THE WATER USED ON SZ.1D
LAND.
EXCEPT DITCH AND ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY

["a;.]

.ACND PROJECT NO. 52056.0.
E.4GLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Fearhzr Road )
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL $ 4 9
O\VNERS: Sharon L. Sharp
SEIIL! SE113 S.8, T.4N. R.IE., B.R.I.

[.era\ Descrirxion fnr d d i t i n n a i Prihlic Rich[-of-Wav
.A parcel of land for Public iiibht-of-Way located in the Southeast Quaner of the
Southeast Quaner of Section 8, Township 4 North, R m g e 1 E a r , Boise Meridian, Ada
Counry, Idaho, said parcel being more panicuiarly described as follows:

Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence North O000'00" East
(formerly North), 827.20 feet along the east line of said Section 8 to a point;
Thence South 90°00'00" West (formerly West), 22.00 feet to a point on the south boundary of Ailten's Second Addition ro Eagle, as filed in Book 4 at Page 150, records of .Ada
Count)', Idaho, said point also being the RE.AL P O M T O F BEGINNING:
Thence continuing South 90°00'00" West, 10.00 feet along the south boundary of said
Aiken's Second Addition to a point,
Thence South 76"2;'54" East, 72.26 feet to a point, said point l y i n ~33.00 fezt at right
angles to said east line of Section 8,
Thence North O000'00" E a t (formerly Nonh), 20.00 feet along a line parallel to the east
line of said Section 8 to the R e d Point of Beginning.

Said Parcel contains 0.0023 .Acres or 100 Square Feet. more or less.
Subject to easements of record or in use.
Basis of Bearing: North 0'00'00" East (formerly NORTH) along the Section Line
common to Sections 8 and 9, Township 4 North. Range 1 East, Boise Meridian. .4da
County, Idaho. as shown on the official Plat for .Ailten's Second .Addition to Eagle .
according io (he official plat thereof filed in Book 1 o f Plats at Paoe 150. records of
,Ada Counry, Idaho.

-

.

.
'

'./

ACHD PROJECT NO. 52056.0,
EAGLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Feather Road )
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL % 19A
OUWERS: Sharon L. Sharp
SE1I.I SEII4 S.8, T.4N, R.IE., B.M.

Lena1 Description for Permanent Easement
A parcel of land for a Permanent Easement located in the Southeast Quaner of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 3 Nonh, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian,
Ada Counry, ldaho, said parcel being more particularly described as foiloivs:
Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence Nonh O"00'00" East
(formerly North), 667.1 1 feet aiong the east line of said Section 8 to a point; thence
South 81"55'00n West, 33.33 feet to a point on the northerly bank of the Drainage Ditch
and also lying on the westerly riglit-of-way line of North Eagle Road, said point being the
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING:
Thence continuing South 81 "55'00" West. 12.12 Feet along said northerly bank to a point.
said point measuring 45.00 feet at right angles to the east line of said Section 8;
Thence Nonh O"OOaOO" East (formerly Nonh), 166.49 feet along a line parallel to the east
iine of said Secrion 8 to a point on the south boundary of Aiken's Second Addition
to Eagie, as filed in Book 4 oFPlats at Page 150. records o f Ada County. Stare of
Idaho:
Thence Nonh 90°00'00" East, 2.00 feet along said south boundary of Aiken's Second
Addition to Eagie to a point:
Thence South 26"33'54" East, 22.36 feet to a point lying 33.00 feet at right angles to said
east line of Section 8,
Thence South O"00'00" East (formerly South), 144.73 feet along a line parallel to the east
line of said Section 8 to the Real Point of Beginning.

Said Parcel contains 0.0433 Acres or I .SSS Square Feet, more or less
Subject to easements of record or in use.
Basis o f B e x i n ~ Nonh
:
O"O0'00" East (fonneriy NORTH) along the Section Line
common to Sections S and 9: Township 4 Nonh.Range I East. Boise Meridian. Ada
Counry. Idaho, as shown on the official Plat ibr Aiken's Second Addition to Eagle.
according to the official plat thereof. filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 150, records of
.Ada County, Idaho.

u003.l.

ACHD PROJECT NO. 52056,01
E.4GLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Feathr; Road )
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL $ 4 9 8
OWNERS: Sharon L. Sharp
SEllJ SE114 S.8, T.4N, R.IE.. B.bI.

Leeal Description for Permanent Fasement
A parcel of land for a Permanent Easement located in the Southeast Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 8,Township 4 North, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Ada
County, Idaho, said parcel being more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence North O"00'00"East
(formerly N o h ) , 567.20feet along the east line of said Section 8 to a point; thence
South 88'38'31" West, 33.01feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way line ofNorth
Eagle Road, said point aiso being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING;
Thence North O"00'00"East (formerly North), 69.77feet along said right-of-way line to
a point on the southerly boundary the Drainage Ditch;
Thence South 70e00'00"West, 18.09feet along said southerly boundary of the Drainage
Ditch to a point measuring 50.00feet at right angles to the east line of Section 8;
Thence South 62"29'58"East. 12.40 feet to a point measuring 33.00feet at right angles
to the east line of said Section 8;
Thence Sourh O000'00"East. 58.00fe:t along a line parallel to said east line of Section S
to a point;
Thence Nonh 88"38'3I " East, 6.00feet to the Real Point of Beginning.

Said Parcel contains 0.0107Acres or 166 Square Feet, more or less
Subject to easements of record or in use.
Basis of Bearing: North O"00'00"East (formerly NORTH) along the Section Line
common io Sections S and 9. Township 4 Noch. Range 1 East. Boise Meridian. Ada
County, Idaho. as shown on the official Plat for .4ikenVsSecond Addition to Eagle.
according to the official plat thereof. filed in Book 4 of Plats a! Page 150. records of
.Ada County, Idaho.
. -.
.
:

,.

- . -.
..

ORDER OF CONDEMNATTON

Project No. ACHD 52056.0
Right-of-way Parcel No. 49
Highway -North Eagle Road
Location - Eagle Road Bypass north to West State Street
Eagle City, Ada County, State of Idaho
The Ada County Highway District Board of Commissioners have, in a regular scheduled
meeting, considered the report and recomniendations ofthe Ada County Highway District's Staff, and
having duly considered the matter, finds:
1.
That the above designated project is for a public use authorized by law, to-wit
(specifL): ACHD Proiect No. 52056.0 -North Eaele Road. Eacle Bvpass north to State Street.

2.
That the right-of-way necessary for the proposed project coilsists of a parcel of real
property located in Ada County, Idaho, more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto,
and by this reference made a part hereof as if set out in full herein.
3.
That the parcel of real property described herein is necessary to the construction and
completion of said project, and that the construction of said project cannot be performed without the
acquisition of said parcei.
4.
That the owners, or reputed owners and claimants of said parcel of real property
known to the Highway District at this time, based upon the Commitment for Title Insurance now. on
file with the Ada County Highway District, are as follows, to-wit:

Sharon L. Sharp
Owner of Record

P.O. Box 38, Eagle, Idaho 83616
Property Address: 127 Eagle Road, Eagle, Idaho 83616

5
That the Ada County Highway District, by and through its agents, employees, and
representatives, has sought in good faith to purchase the land sought to be taken, or to settle with the
owners, or reputed owners, for the damages which might resuit to their property from said taking, and
have been unable to make any reasonable bargain therefore, or settlement of such damages.
6.
That the location of the land sought to be taken by the Highway District is most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury, and that Ada County Highway
District has the power of Eminent Domain.
7.
That all rights of access to, From, and between the right-of-way of the public way and
all of the contiguous remaining real property ofthe above named owners, or reputed owners, shall be
extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described.

ORDER OF CONDEMNAT'
Page 2 of 2 Pages

RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL:

By:

4.
fliL.,--A

By:

u ~ e n y & f ~ y m a n ,~ i & t o r
Chief of Right-of-way
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the
acquisition of the land and property rights hereinabove described is necessary to the construction and
maintenance of the said Highway Project hereinabove described.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that The Ada County Highway District shall acquire the
hereinabove described real property and property rights through the power of Eminent Domain.
Dated this (qW. day of
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-

, 1997.

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

ATTEST:

By:

/
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4ss+-7~~

. Nyman, B~rector

Ada County Highway District

Susan S. gastlake, President
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February 25, 1997

CERTIFIED MAIL AND
REGULAR POST

__Z

Sharon L. Sharp
P.O. Box 38
127 North Eagle Road
Eagle, ldaho 8361 6
RE:

ACHD Project No. 52056.0 - North Eagle Road, Eagle Bypass North to
State Street
Right-o f- Wa y Parcel No. 49

Dear Ms. Sharp:
We represent the legal interests of the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"),
and in this capacity it has employed us to pursue condemnation of a portion of
property owned by you that is generally located at 127 North Eagle Road, Eagle, ldaho
8361 6, and more particularly described on Exhibits A, 8, C and D attached hereto (the
"Property ").
The ACHD Board of Commissioners on February 19, 1997, entered an order of
condemnation instructing the ACHD to proceed forward with the condemnation action
on the Property. Thus, as a precursor to such condemnation proceeding, and i n an
effort to resolve this matter, I am writing to you.

It is our understanding that an initial offer was made to you in the sum of
$14,780.00, which is the appraised price based upon an appraisal performed by
Ambrose Appraisal Company. Subsequently, further negotiations were had, and
ACHD made a settlement offer on January 21,1997, in the sum of $16,258.00. This
offer was calculated as follows:
Public Right-of-way:
Permanent easement:
Value of improvements taken
Administrative Settlement
TOTAL

. x $7.00 per sq. ft. =
100 ~ q ft.
1,888 sq. ft. x $7.00 per sq.ft. x 75% =
466 sq. ft. x $8.75 per sq. ft. x 75% =

$700
$9,912
$3,058
$1,110
$1.478
$16,258

'

Sharon L. Sharp
February 25, 1 9 9 7
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It is our further understanding that ACHD agreed t o several requests made b y
you, which are as follows:

A.

B.
C.

D.

Temporary fencing will be erected t o protect your cats during the
construction proje,ct;
Your ingress and egress on Eagle Road will remain the same;
You may choose your landscape company for pruning your trees t h a t
border the Property, and ACHD will p a y for this service; and
ACHD will install three-sided boxes around the mature trees bordering
the Property in order t o protect them. (This does n o t include t h e tree o n
the south side of the canal w h i c h needs t o be removed.)

It is m y understanding that you have rejected this last proposal, b u t that you
have not communicated an alternative settlement price.
Therefore, ACHD has authorized me t o extend a final settlement offer t o y o u
in the sum of $76,258, with ACHD agreeing t o comply w i t h the items specified
above, which settlement sum shall be paid u p o n execution and delivery o f a warranty
deed and permanent easement in favor of ACHD.
This offer is open u p .through and including March 3, 1997, at 5:00 p.m.,
Mountain Standard Time, at which time it shall b e deemed terminated and withdrawn.
In the eventthe offer is n o t accepted, ACHD w i l l pursue condemnation of t h e Property
based- upon' the appraised price of $14,780, a n d I will file a complaint for
condemnation w i t h t h e Ada County Clerk o f t h e Court o n Tuesday, M a r c h 4, 1997.
Please feel free t o contact me if you have any questions or concerns, or desire
t o discuss the settlement proposal.

KDGIslp
cc:
David Wynkoop
Ray Putman

E DON COPPLE
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Telecopier: (208) 386-9428
ISB Nos. 1085 and 5480

Attorneys for: Sharon L. Sharp

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a body politic corporate of the
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

1

1

1
)

VS.
SHARON L. SHARP,
Defendant-Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 26237
D. C. No. CV OC 9701 148D
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW
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)

DefendantiAppellant, by and through her attorneys, Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple,
submits this brief in support of her petition for review of the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion filed
April 17,2001
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As the Court of Appeals decisions did not correctly set forth all of therelevant facts presented
on appeal, a brief Statement of the Case is presented here for the Court's information. Legal
argument and authority in support of the Petition for Review follows.
On February 19, 1997, the Ada County Highway District (hereinafter"ACHD"), entered an
official Order of Condemnation relating to the property owned by Sharon Sharp (hereinafter
"Sharp"). The Order specified the property rights to be acquired, including the following:
7. That all rights of access to, from, and between the right-of-way of the public way and all
of the contiguous remaining real property of the named owners, or reputed owners, shall be
extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described.'

The Order of Condemnation was signed by the ACHD Commissioners and was attached to the
Complaint for condemnation, filed March 6, 1997, as Exhibit B.' A copy of the Order is attached
hereto as Appendix A.
This case is about the ACHD's refusal to accept responsibility for the consequences of its
Order of Condemnation. ACHD has sought to escape the plain and unambiguous language of its
Order in order to avoid paying damages to Sharp, and induced the trial court into deciding issues not
properly before it.
ACHD elected to undertake a public project to widen the portion of Eagle Road between the

' R., Vol. 1, p. 13.
*

R., Vol. 1, pgs. 13-14.
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Eagle Bypass and State Street in Eagle, Idaho. Sharp owns three contiguous lots on the corner of
Eagle Road and Aikens street3 A copy of the most recent record of survey for the Sharp property
is attached hereto as Appendix B. Currently there are three residential homes on the Sharp lots. Two
of the lots have fiontage on Eagle Road and residential access driveways onto Eagle; the third has
access off of Aikens. An aerial photograph of the property in the before take condition is attached
hereto as Appendix C.4 A drawing depicting the residential use of the Sharp property is attached
hereto as Appendix D.'
It is undisputed that the highest and best use of Sharp's property is commercial, not
residential, and that the existing residential access points onto Eagle could not serve commercial
de~elopment.~
Likely all three lots would be developed together as one commercial de~elopment.~
A drawing illustrating the highest and best use of the Sharp property as of the date of taking, in the
before take condition, is attached hereto as Appendix E.* A drawing illustrating the highest and best

3

Exhibit 27 to the Record, Affidavit of Mark Richey in Support of Defendart's Second Motion to Allow
Severance Damages at Trial, Filed June 25, 1999, Record of Survey attached to appraisal report.
4

Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 103

5

Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 101.

6

TI., Vol. I, p. 966,L. 11-22; TI., Vol. I,p. 1047, L. 10-14; TI., Vol. I,p. 1108, L. 22 through p. 1109,

L. 3.
7

Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage, Exhibit A thereto,
Affidavit ofChris Korte to Accompany Defendant's Offer of Proof, p. 5.
Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 123.
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use of the Sharp property as of the date of taking, in the after take contiition, is attached hereto as
Appendix F?
Despite the fact that ACHD recognized the highest and best use of Sharp's property was for
commercial use, ACHD prepared plans for the widening project which pxovided Sharp with only her
current residential access driveways onto Eagle Road rather than providing access suitable for
commercial use of the property."
During right-of-way acquisition negotiations, Sharp made clear her concern regardingthe fact
that ACHD was taking her access rights to and from Eagle Road, which would devalue her property.
This concern was memorialized in an ACHD internal memo from Right of Way Agent Dick Brown.
Mr. Brown listed Ms. Sharp's concerns in the memo along with ACHD's responses to those
concerns. The relevant portions of the January 24,1997 Brown Memo provided:

6. She wants some access to Eagle, other than the one presently in existence on the comer
of Aikens and Eagle Road
6. Answer - She may have the access to Eagle Road as it now exists. Once the property
sells, this access will be taken away. Franz Witte said that it was her choice. The property
was valued at its present condition. I said I would ask if she could have another access to
Eagle Road, other than the access now on the corner."

Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 124.
10

Court Trial Exhibits 149 & 150 are ACHD's Final Construction Plans for the area of Sharp's property.

11

Court Trial Exhibit 125; Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance
Damage to the Remainder, Filed December 13,1999 (See specifically Exhibit B of the Offer of Proof, Affidavit of
Patrick Dobie, Exhibit D to that Affidavit is the Dick Brown Memo.)
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A copy of the Brown Memo is attached hereto as Appendix G.
Ms. Sharp was repeatedly advised that she could only have the existing residential access to
and from Eagle Road after the taking, and no other access.'' ACHD offered Sharp $16,258.00 for
the taking of her property and property rights for its project.'3 When ACHD was not able to reach
an agreement with Sharp, it entered its Order of Condemnation defining the property rights to be
acquired and filed suit to take the same via condemnation.
Sharp retained several experts to determine the value of her property both before and after
the taking and to assessjust compensation. Mark Richey, a certified MA1appraiser, determined that
the loss of commercial access rights to and 60m Eagle road substantially impacted the value of her
property and determined that just compensation due was $440,000.'4 Roger Wood, a commercial
real estate broker, reached the same conclusion regarding the impact of the taking and concluded just
compensation was $390,000 in his opinion." Ron McConnell, arealtor with JensenReal Estate, also
determined that the loss of access rights impaired the value and marketability of Sharp's property,

I2

Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 2.
l 3 Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 4.
14

Exhibit 34 lo the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder,
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit C thereto, Affidavit of Mark W. Richey, p. 3.
l5 Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder,
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit F thereto, Affidavit of Roger W. Wood, p. 6.
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and estimated just compensation to be $456,733.16Art Berry, a business appraiser with experience
buying and selling commercial real estate, also concluded the loss of access rights damages the
property's value and assessed just compensation at $447,000.17
In addition to the Order of Condemnation, there was a second reason Sharp's experts
believed full commercial access to Eagle Road was taken by the project. The experts had considered
the installation of a traffic light at the intersection of Plaza Street and Eagle Road. Pat Dobie, a
traffic engineer retained by Sharp, believed, based on ACHD documents and plans, that Plaza Street
andthe traffic signal were part of the Eagle Road widening project. Since Eagle Road is functionally
classified as a Minor Arterial road and ACHD policy does not allow full access driveways within
440' of a signalized intersection on that type of road, the Sharp property would not qualify for access
to and from Eagle Road after the project.
ACHD then took the position that the traffic signal and pima Street were not part of the
project and therefore could not be considered in assessing damages to Sharp's property, and further,
that ACHD would treat Eagle Road as a Collector rather than as a Minor Arterial if access was
requested. ACHD claimed that the dispute on these factual issues was one that needed to be resolved
by the trial court, and therefore the jury trial was vacated and a Court Trial was set to commence.
The Court Trial was held to determine the classification of Eagle Road and whether Plaza
16

Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder,
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit D thereto, Affidavit of Ron McConnell, Exhibit C to McConnell's Affidavit.
17

Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder,
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit E thereto, Affidavit of Arthur J. Beny, p. 6.
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Street and the signal were or were not part of the project. The trial was n> to address whether any
damage to Sharp's property had occurred from any source. Sharp set forth the issues in her pretrial
brief to the Court:
It is the Defendant's understanding from the previous pretrial conferencesthat the only issues
UDOn which the Court is to receive evidence and make a factual determination are:
A.
Is the relevant section of Eagle Road classified as a collector or a minor
arterial?
B.
What is the ACHD project?
1.
Is Plaza Street and/or the Eagle RoadIPlaza intersection part of the
ACHD project?
2.
Is the signalization of Plaza Street part of the ACHD project?"
ACHD's Pretrial Memorandum contained a broader statement of the issues because ACHD
included items which had already been stipulated to (such as whether ACHD had a right of eminent
domain) and a variety of miscellaneous issues, as well as those enumerated by Sharp." However,
the issues were stripped down to the same two issues Defendant Sharp set forth in her Pretrial
Memorandum by the time the Court Trial Commenced. Mr. Jones, representing ACHD, defined the
scope of the trial in his opening statement as follows:

I submit that the thrust of the matter today pertains to two separate issues. One is a
question with respect to a potential signal light at the comer of Eagle Road and Plaza Street,
and whether that signal light is or is not part of the construction project that more generally
runs from north of State Street down to the comer of Eagle Road and Plaza Street.
And the second issue that we intend to address today directly is the question of the
status of Eagle Road. There's a dispute between the parties as to the matter of Eagle Road.
There's a dispute between the parties as to the matter of Eagle Road as to whether it's a

18

Exhibit 14 to the Record, Defendant's Pretrial Memorandum For Court Trial, pg. 2.

'' Exhibit 13 to the Record, Plaintiffs Pretrial Memorandum For Court Trial, pgs. 1-2
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collector street or an arterial, and depending upon the factual resolution the Court then may
have legal issues pertaining to the affect of that designation or that fact finding on the right
of access of the Sharp propeicy to Eagle Road."
It is significant to note that although Sharp had two wholly independent bases for her claim
that she had lost commercial access rights to and from Eagle Road (the Order of Condemnation and
the traffic signal), ACHD chose to offer no testimony at all on the Order of Condemnation or its
meaning or construction. The Order was admitted at the court trial as Exhibit 160 without objection
from ACHD?'

Larry Sale, head of Development Services at ACHD, testified at the Court Trial on crossexamination as follows:
"Q: Mr. Sale, have you had a chance to read paragraph 7 of Exhibit 160?"
"A: I have."
"Q: And doesn't this portion of the order of condemnation extinguish all access of Sheni
Sharp's property other than the access depicted on the project plans that we have been
discussing?"
"A: Your Honor, that may be what that sentence means. I prefer not to interpret it.'"2

Throughout the course of the trial, no further evidence was offered regarding the meaning
of the Order of Condemnation. In closing argument, ACHD failed to mention the Order or its effect
in any way.23Sharp's closing focused heavily on the Order and its clear and precise language which

20

Tr., P. 25, Lns. 7-22.

21

T r , p. 326, Lns. 16-25

22

Tr., p. 327, Lns. 17-25.

23

Tr., p. 594, L. 7 through p. 6 17, L. 17.
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explicitly took all access rights to and from Eagle Road other than existing residential access.24 It
was clearly established during the court trial that the existing residential access driveways could not
serve or accommodate commercial use of the Sharp property; the effect of the Order was therefore
undeniably to leave Sharp with no access rights to Eagle Road for commercial purposes.
In rebuttal argument, Mr. Jones addressed the Order of Condemnation issue for the first time.
As ACHD had introduced no evidence relating to the Order of Condemnation, the only mention of
the Order or its meaning came in rebuttal argument from Mr. Jones, which is quoted in its entirety
as follows:
With respect to the order of condemnation I really find it fascinating that if the
defendant really thought that was the end all to all this why we didn't see a motion for
summary judgment. If purely legal question, no factual issue, and so plain on its face and
all of this, I think defendants are grasping at straws and twisting in the wind on it. They have
quoted one or two lines from the order of condemnation. All that order of condemnation
says is that all rights of access to and from the property are taken except for access if any in
the project here and above described. And the project here and above described gave them
the same access they already have. Doesn't say residential access. The drawing and plans
and project documents don't show any different access.
Also defense conveniently overlooked the fact that the complaint which sought to
condemn property doesn't take any access. It simply provides for the taking of a portion on
the corner, the hundred square feet and the slope easement. And makes no reference to
condemning any access. And I submit that all that statement in the order of condemnation
says it's a form provision that access is going to be taken and that all access is taken except
what is in the plan. The plans gave them the same access they have had before the plans
were drawn. And as to any future access it would depend on whatever the rules and
regulations are. And Like I say, complaint certainly doesn't seek to condemn any access.25

24

Tr., p. 617, L. 19 through p. 660, L. 12

25

Tr., p. 660, L. 16 through p. 661, L. 20.
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The trial court found in its oral ruling from the bench26and in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered on September 18, 1998 that the Order of Condemnation was not
relevant in determining whether access had been taken.z7
29.The February 29,1997, order of condemnation (exhibit 160) is not material to the access
issue. [Finding of FactlZ8
H. The February 29,1997, order ifcondemnation (Exhibit 160) is not material to access issue
at all and when read in context and its entirety, simply defines the access that is available to
the Sharp property exactly as it exists, namely that the Sharp property has two residential
access points that currently exists, plus it has the right to apply upon commercial
development for commercial access points. [Conclusion of LawIz9
ACHD submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which also invited the Court to
rule as a matter of law that there was no severance damage to the Sharp property caused by the
taking.)' Sharp objected to the proposed findings and conclusions since no valuation testimony,
which would address the presence or absence of severance damage, had been offered by either side
at trial.)' Despite this, the trial court entered a finding of fact and a conclusion of law that there was
no severance:

26

Tr. P. 672, L. 25 through p. 673, L. 18,

28

R., Vol. I, pg. 102

29

R., Vol. I., pg. 106

30

Exhibit 17to the Record, Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Received
August 7, 1999, p. 12.

R., Val. I, pgs. 89-90.

-
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42. The Sharp property has incurred no severance damages as a result of the ~ a k e . ~ '
I. The Sharp property has incurred no severance damages as a result of the Take.33
At that point in the litigation, Sharp had incurred $52,375.78 in costs34to assess just
compensation based on ACHD's representations35that access other than existing residential access
was being taken as part of the ~ondemnation.~~
In addition, substantial attorney time had been
consumed, with $69,143.95 in time invested in the case.37The trial court found that the traffic light
and Plaza Street were not part of the ACHD pr~ject'~
and that the classification of Eagle Road as an
Arterial or Collector was irrelevant. The Court had also found the Order of Condemnation to be
irrelevant to the access issue.39 Therefore, Sharp could not introduce evidence at the jury trial that
she had lost her commercial access rights to Eagle Road, devaluing her property. Since, at ACHD's

32

R., Vol. I, p. 104

33

R., Vol. I, p. 106.

34

Exhibit 43 to the Record, Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Fees, Filed Janualy 11,2000, pgs. 5-6.
35

Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 5.
j6 Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defmdant's Motion For Attorneys
Fees & Costs, Filed January 11,2000, pg. 4.

37 Exhibit 43 to the Record, Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Costs and Attorneys Fees, pg. 4,

R., Vo1. I, p. 102, NO. 33.
39

R., Vol. I., p. 102, No. 28.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW - 12

urging, the trial court had also ruled that there was no severance damage to the Sharp property from
any source, Sharp and ACHD were left with only the task of assessing the value to be paid for the
taking of an easement, some trees, and a portion of the Sharp property in fee simple.
Sharp then pursued an interlocutory appeal to this Court, which was reje~ted.~'Sharp filed
a Motion for Reconsideration4' and presented the trial court with substantial legal authority from
otherjurisdictions holding that orders of condemnation define the rights acquired by the condemnor
and the condemnor must pay for those rights."' Despite the fact that ACHD produced no legal
authority to the

the trial court, after hearing argun~ent,44denied the Motion for

Reconsideration4' and scheduled a jury trial.
At the jury trial, ACHD appraiser David Ambrose testified that just compensation was

$17,62346and ACHD appraiser Joe Corlett testified that in his opinion just compensation was

40

R., VOI.I, p. 108

41

R., Vol. I, pgs. 122-124.

42 Exhibit 20 to the Record, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law Entered on September 18, 1998.

43

Exhibit 21 to the Record, Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Filed January 13,1999.
44

Oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration, Tr., p. 688, L. 1 tkoughp. 715, L. 14

45

R., Vol. I, pgs. 129-130

46

Tr., p. 1155, Lns. 3-6.
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$9,005.47.47Sharp, precluded from introducing any evidence of severancedamage from any source,
offered testimony from appraiser Mark Richey that the value of the taking andjust compensationwas
$19,155.~~
ACHD advocated $9,005 as just compen~ation~~
and argued that its own appraiser,
Ambrose, was inc~rrect.'~
The jury returned a verdict of $16,507.00.51
Sharp then sought costs and fees, as the jury verdict was closer to Sharp's figure than to that
advocated by ACHD, and as she had incurred costs and fees in reliance upon ACHD's
representations that access rights were being condemned. The trial court awarded no costs and fees
to Sharp and noted "1 view the whole case, frankly, and in fairness, as a waste of time."52
The issues on appeal are very narrow and are questions of first impression in Idaho. Note
that Sharp is not appealing any issues relating to the classification of Eagle Road or the installation
of a traffic light at the Plaza StreetiEagle Road intersection.

47

Tr., p. 1073, Lns. 14-22.

48

Tr., p. 1001, Lns. 19-25

49

Tr., p. 1205, Lns. 4-25.
Tr., VoI. t, p. 1200, L. 24 through p. 1205, L. 3.

''
92

R., Vol. I, p. 176.
Tr., p. 1298, Lns. 23-24.
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITlON FOR REVIEW
A. The Court of Appeals has ruled that in a direct condemnation actionin the State of Idaho the trial
court determines what is taken for public purposes. rather than the condemnor
Condemning authorities have been entrusted by the Idaho Legislature with the power of
eminent domain. These condemnors have also been charged with the responsibility to ascertainwhat
is needed for public use, as both necessity and public use are prerequisites to a taking by the exercise
of the eminent domain power.
The result of the Court of Appeals decision is that trial courts will be placed in the position
of deciding what property and property rights are to be acquired by condemnors, rather than having
the condemning authorities decide what rights they need to acquire. The decision regarding what
will be taken is removed from the condemnor, and then the condemning agencies will be required
under the Idaho Constitution, Section I, Article 14, and the Idaho Statutes, I.C. jj 7-71 1, to pay for
the rights the trial court has determined it must acquire. This flies in the face of the majority of cases
from other jurisdictions to consider this issue. (In fact, Appellant is aware of no case in any
jurisdiction which supports the position taken by the Idaho Court of Appeals in this regard).
The power to determine the taking is a power of the sovereign, not the trial court. As the
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated in City of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnuis, CO.,25 1
N.C. 531,533,112 S.E.2d 111 (1960):
The power of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public
use, is inherent in sovereignty. Our Constitution, art. I, sec. 17, requires payment of
fair compensation for the property so taken. This is the only limitation imposed on
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sovereignty with respect to taking.
The taking must, of course, be for a public purpose, but the sovereign determines the
nature and extent of the property required for that purpose. It may take for a limited
period of time or in perpetuity. It may take and easement, a mere limited use, leaving
the owner with the right to use in any manner he may desire so long as such use does
not interfere with the use by the sovereign for the purpose for which it takes, or it
may take an absolute, unqualified fee, terminating all of defendant's property rights
in the land taken. [Citations omitted]
The general rule is that courts may review the condemnor's definition of what property and
property rights are being acquired only where there has been gross abuse or manifest fraud on the
part of the condemnor. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia noted in its decision in Virginia
Electric and Power Co. v. Webb, 196 Va. 555,84 S.E.2d 735,740 (1954):
'The grantee of the power of eminent domain may ordinarily exercise a large discretion not
only in respect of the particular property, but also as to the amount of land to be taken for the
public purpose. This discretion is not reviewable by the courts, unless, possibly, where there
has been a gross abuse or manifest fraud.' * * * ' 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, $109, p.
736. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57,40 S.Ct. 62,64 L.ed. 135.
'It is competent for the courts to supervise the exercise of the power delegated, but they
cannot invade the bounds set by the Legislature; and will not undertake to control the
discretion of the companies in taking property for their own use, unless there has been a very
clear abuse of power. * * *' Zircle v. Southern Ry. Co., 102 Va. 17,20,45 S.E. 802, State
v. Horner, 121 W.Va. 75, 1 S.E.(2d)486.
'Unless the discretion of the condemning agency as to reasonable necessity is wrongfully,
arbitrarily, or oppressively exercised, that discretion cannot be controlled or reviewed by the
court. * * *' Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 454,463,
50 A.(2d) 918.
The same rule was well articulated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Atkinson v. Carolina
Power & Light, Co., 239 S.C. 150, 121 S.E.2d 743,746 (1961):
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By Section 24-12 of the 1952 Code of Laws the Legislature of South Carolina has
expressly delegated to the defendant company, and all others sinlilarly engaged, the
power of eminent domain. In the exercise of that power those to whom it has been
delegated represent the sovereignty of the state, and are empowered to decide, subject
only to supervision of the courts to avoid fraudulent or capricious abuse, what and
how much land of the citizens they will condemn for their purposes. As stated by the
Court in the case of Boofiart v. Central Electric Power Company Cooperative, 222
S.C. 289,72 S.E.2d 576,578, quoting from 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain 3 89, p. 882:
'The legislature may delegate the power of determining the necessity of
exercising the power of eminent domain to public officers or boards or to
private corporations vested with the power of eminent domain, and in the
absence of any statutory provision submitting the matter to a court or jury the
decision of the question of necessity lies with the body of individuals to
whom the state has delegated the authority to take. Generally, a
determination by the grantee of the power is conclusive and is not subject to
judicial review, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or clear abuse of discretion.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has taken a rule developed in inverse condemnation cases and
applied it in direct takings cases, ruling that the trial court decides all issues except just
compensation, includingthe issue ofwhatproperty andproperty rights are beingacquired. The rule
in other states is that the condemnor defines the taking and this definition is not disturbed by the trial
court. If an issue of interpretation arises due to an ambiguity in the definition of the taking, the
Courts may determine that issue as a matter of law, not a matter of fact. As a result of the Court of
Appeals decision, trial courts in Idaho will be called upon to define the taking as amatter of fact, and
the sovereign power the legislature gave to the condemnor will be infringed.

An additional result is that litigation expenses will increase for both sides in condemnation
actions and the court system will endure additional burdens. It will become necessary to have either
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a hearing or a court trial in each condemnation case in order to determine the property and property
rights to be acquired ("the take"). Prior to the Court of Appeals decision, the take was determined
by the condemning authority and set forth in resolutions or orders of condemnation. The Court of
Appeals has ruled that official resolutions and orders entered by condemning authorities which
purport to define the taking in fact do not do so, and it is the role of the trial court to determine the
taking. The result is an open invitation to property owners to dispute, or at the very least insist on
defining, the taking in every case. This will consume additional costs and judicial resources. It
would be unreasonableto expect property owners facing condemnation to incur substantialcosts and
attorneys fees assessingjust compensation due to them before the property and property rights to be
acquired have been defined with certainty, which, after the Court of Appeals decision, can only he
done by the trial court after evidence is presented.
B. The Court of Avveals' decision also has broad ramifications for evervvrovertv owner in the State
of Idaho. as all private provemi is subiect to the power ofeminent domain and the Court of Awpeals'
decision has an effect on every condemnation case filed henceforth.
Every property owner who negotiates with the condemnor and sells their property and
property rights to the government without the necessity of a condemnation complaint being filed will
be effected by the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals has basically accepted the Ada
County Highway District's (ACHD) position in this case that the official Order of Condemnation
entered by the ACHD and signed by the ACHD Commissioners, which defined explicitly the
property and property rights to be acquired, is mere meaningless form language.
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In condemnation actions where a lawsuit is filed, the condemnee may seek to have the trial
court determine the taking as the Court of Appeals has empowered it to do in its decision. Therefore
the property owner will have an opportunity to have the taking defined if he or she is sued.
However, all of the property owners who settle their cases short of a condemnation proceeding will
be relying on Orders of Condemnation which define the property and property rights taken. In light
of the Court of Appeals decision that the language of the Order of Condemnation is not binding,
property owners will be selling property rights to condemnors without any protected reliance upon
the Order of Condemnation.
C. The Court of Ao~ealscites only one case in support of its position, Ruetk v. State, which actually
cites to cases which support Aopellants position in this appeal which the Court of Appeals reiected
The Court of Appeals has cited Ruetk v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 (1978) to support
its position, noting and relying upon the fact that the Ruetk decision cited approvingly a portion of
a Kansas case, Brockv. State Highway Commission,404 P.2d 934 (Kan. I 965). The Brockcase, like
the Ruetk case, was an inverse condemnation action, not a direct condemnation action like the
present case.
The Brock decision actually cites approvingly to a 1964 Kansas decision, Roberts v. Upper

Verdigris Watershed Joint District No. 24, 392 P.2d 914, 193 Kan. 151 (1964). The Roberts
decision is a direct condemnation case and supports the position Appellant Sharp argued and briefed
to the Court of Appeals and was cited in the Appellant's brief as supporting authority. In addition,
three subsequent Kansas decisions, all of which were direct condemnation cases, support Appellant
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Sharp's position and were cited in the Appellant's Brief but not discussed by the Court of Appeals:

Application of City of Great Bend, Kansas, 869 P.2d 587,254 Kan. 699 (1994); Barcus v. City of
Kansas City, 661 P.2d 806,s Kan.App.2d 506 (1983); Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 246 Kan. 395,
790 P.2d 933 (1990).
In Barcus v. City of Kansas City, 661 P.2d 806, 8 Kan.App.2d 506 (1983), the Court of
Appeals of Kansas discussed at length the same issue presented on appeal in this case. The Kansas
court defined the issue as follows:
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant City of
Kansas City to present evidence of damages based on a lesser use by the City of the
easements acquired than that described in the appraiser's report and the petition of
condemnation. Barcus. 661 P.2d at 807.
In the Barcus case, the condemnation petition did not expressly reserve access rights to the property
owner and the project plans showed some physical access to the remaining property, though no legal
rights of access were reserved to the owner. In this case, ACHD's project plans showed two
residential access driveways physically located on the remaining property, and the Order of
Condemnation expressly extinguished all rights of access other than those two existing physical
driveways, which it is undisputed could not serve any development of the Sharp property.
Though the entire decision is instructive, the following is an excerpt of the Kansas decision
which clearly elucidates the Court's analysis of the issue and makes a stark comparison to how the
Idaho Court of Appeals handled the issue in this case:
In Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, 193 Kan. 151,157-59,392 P.2d 914 (1964)
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the court stated much the same rule when confronted with a case which dealt with the
question of the extent of use of an easement. The court stated:
"The commissioners' report, and only their report, is evidence of the land
appropriated, the extent of the easement and its use.
"In Mercantile Co, v. O.H. & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174,42 Pac. 712, it is stated:
"'A railroad company seeking to condemn land for a right of way or other use
connected with the construction and operation of its railroad, under the statute, takes
only a right to the use of such land as is definitely described in the report of the
commissioners. The concealed purposes or intentions of the representatives of the
company or of the board of comnlissioners can confer no rights. The landowner may
rely implicitly on the report filed. The commissioners in this case condemned a right
of way across 20 acres only. The law requires the commissioners to embody their
doings in a written report, and to file the same with county clerk. This report
becomes the evidence, and the only evidence, of their doings. (The State v. Armell,
8 Kan. 288; Reisner v. Union Depot & Rld. Co., 27 [Kan.] 382; C.K. & W. Rld. CO.
v. Grovier, 41 [Kan.] 685 [21 P. 7791.' (Pp. 175, 176 [42 P. 7121.)
"The above case was cited with approval in our recent case of Sutton v. Frazier,
183 Kan. 33,325 P.2d 338, where we said:
"'... Pursuant to the empowering statue Sunflower took the land definitely
described in the report of appraisers for the uses specified in the notice. The report
of the appraisers must show what is taken, and what the landowners part with.
Nothing is taken by implication or intendment. The landowners may rely implicitly
on the report filed. This report becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the
commissioners' doings. (Mercantile Co. v. 0 . H & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174,42 Pac.
712; State v. Armell, 8 Kan. 288; and C.K. & W. Rld. Co. v. Grovier, 41 Kan. 685,
2 1 Pac. 779.) ...' p43 [325 P.2d 2281.
"The landowners and the condemner may, and must, rely on the language of the
commissioners' report as to the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. If
the landowners are not compensated in$ll for the full use, as set out in the report,
the condemner can take thefull use in thefuture withoutfurther compensation to the
landowners.
"The evidence introduced on appeal from a condemnation award does not become
a part of the commissioners' report which is filed with the register of deeds and
determines the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. The injustice that
would result to the landowners is readily
i f a condemner could introduce
- auparent,
-evidence as to a limited use for the purpose ofreducing the amount of damages to
the landowners, and later exercise the full use by virtue of'thecommissioners' report.
"The extent of the easement and the extent bf the us;, that is the rights reqGired,
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are not questions of fact. They are questions of law to be determined from the
language used in the commissioners' report....
"The condemner contends that it was entitled to show the nature of the detention
structurewhich would cause the impoundment of water on the easement condemned,
the purpose being to show only an infrequent or limited use of the easement. The
fallacy of the contention is that the nature of the dam or detention structure was not
made a part of the commissioners' report which controls the extent of the easement
and the use.
"It is suggested that watershed districts are a matter of public benefit and their
construction will be rendered impracticable if damages must be paid in full for the
value of land which is only infrequently and temporarily inundated. The suggestion
has no merit. If the condemner desires only an infrequent limited use of the easement
condemned it need only make certain that the limited use is properly stated in the
petition and incorporated in the commissioners's report which is filed with the
register of deeds and governs the extent of the easement and the extent of the use.
That has not been done in this case.
"We must conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence as to the
condemner's fhture intended use which varied the extent of the use set out in the
commissioners' rep0rt...." (Emphasis supplied.)
The above rules were cited authoritatively in Die$nbach v. State Highway
Commission, 195 Kan. 445,448-49,407 P.2d 228 (1965):
"The condemner cannot now contend before the jury that it intends only a limited
use where the right taken is perpetual. In Sutton v Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 325 P.2d
228, we held:
"'In an eminent domain proceeding the report of the appraisers must show what
is taken, and what the landowners part with. Nothing is taken by implication or
intendment, and the landowners may rely implicitly on the report filed which
becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the commissioners' doings.' (Syl. 8.)
"The landowners are entitled to compensation based on the Cull use which the
condemner has the right to exercise over the easement condemned as described in the
condemner's petition and considered by the appraisers. (Roberts v. Upper Verdigris
Watershed, 193 Kan. 151,392 P.2d 914.)"
See also Spears v . Kansas City Power &Light b.,
203 Kan. 520, 524-25, 455 P.2d 496
(1969).
The present case is similar to the above cited cases in that there has been a taking and
the land taken has subsequently been used in a limited manner. Accordingly, it must first be
determined whether there has been a reservation of an easement for plaintiffs to have the
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unlimited use and enjoyment of the land being used in a limited manner.
An examination of the condemnation petition in the present case reveals that there
has not been an express reservation of an easement to plaintiffs for their access under the
City's highway. The pertinent description states; "A Permanent Easement for controlled
access highway right of way and removal of borrow material over and upon a tract of land
in...." (Emphasis supplied.) Although an access road had been provided, there is no
indication whether the road is to be maintained or whether the City will continue to permit
plaintiffs to use the road. The City would be within its rights to fence off the area completely
at any time. Jack Forbes, one of the City's appraisers, gave his opinion as to the existence
of the access:
"And in my opinion a prudent and typical investor, who is contemplating buying
this land for famlland, or whatever you want to say he wants to buy it for, if he would
look at the plans himself, if he had any qualms himself, or any reservations about
access from one part to the other, he would contact the city or contact the Department
of Transportation, which I have.
"And he would find out that there would be access under that bridge. And he
would also find out if he needs it, they will give him a legal instrument which it
allows him to have any reservation or apermanent easementfor ingress and egress.
"And that's really the true test, in my opinion. And you have no reservations
about the rights of access from one part of the land to the other." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Forbes' testimony, based upon contact with the City or Department of Transportation,
indicates that for total assurance, a legal instrument or permanent easement would need to
be exchanged between the parties. This testimony clearly indicates that such a reservation
of easement to plaintiffs does not already exist, even in light of the existence of the access
road on the project plans.
The facts in this case can be compared to those in the Hoy case, where the State had
its easement fenced in such a manner as to allow access to a well. There the court noted that
the State had not in fact offered to return the land to the owner. The placement of the fence
was therefore considered a "conditional" condemnation, and its assurance that the
landowners could use the well was merely promissory. The court concluded it was improper
to consider evidence of the placement of the fence and the landowner's access thereto in the
trial to determine damages for the taking.
We arrive at a similar conclusion in the present case. While the project plans
apparently do provide for an access road and such a road has been constructed, the rights of
plaintiffs to the continued use of the road have not been legally established. Therefore, we
hold that it was improper for the jury to consider the existence of the road and the resulting
access when determining plaintiffs' damages for the taking. The trial court erred by allowing
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such testimony. Barcus, 661 P.2d at 810 - 812.
The Barcus court reversed and remanded for new trial. In that case, the issue arose at the jury trial
on valuation. In this case, because a separate court trial before the valuation trial was held.
The Court of Appeals also cites to a portion of Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75
(1978), which refers favorably to California law. California law also supports Appellant's position
taken in this appeal.
In the case of County ofSan Diego v. Mary E. Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. 44,184 CalApp.3d 112
(1986), the condemnor took an avigation easement over Bressi's property. The easement contained
very broad language providing that any aircraft of any type could fly over the Bressi property;
however, at trial the condemnor sought to introduce evidence that it did not intend to have jets use
the airspace. Bressi argued that the resolution of necessity which defined the taking clearly allowed
for jets to fly over her property and that she could therefore assess damages considering that fact.
The California Court of Appeals summarized the issue as follows:
Bressi's evidentiaty argument is quite simple. She says we must focus on the
language of the resolution of necessity. That resolution subjects her property to overflight
by any aircraft including, but not limited to, jumbo jets or any other contrivance yet to be
invented for flight in space. She claims that in light of the resolution, the County should not
be allowed to present evidence contradicting the resolution and thus compensate her for a
lesser taking. Bressi metaphorically asserts the County cannot have its 'take' and eat it too
by introducing evidence showing that Palomar Airport will in all likelihood never expand
to serve commercial aircraft.
The County responds by saying that we must focus on the important role of the jury
in the judicial process. The County contends that Bressi's doctrinaire argument will merely
frustrate the jury's role which is to determine the fair market value of the property taken. If
the jury is deprived of evidence relating to all hture plans affecting the development of

-
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Palomar Airport it will lack the essential evidencewhich it needs to decide true market value.
We frankly admit that each argument has certain appeal. Eachrecommended solution
contains elements of logic and fairness. Unfortunately, each proposed solution creates the
potential for unfairness. If we accevt the Countv's argument Bressi faces the risk she will
hot be filly compensated for what tie County has taken. If we accept Bressi's argument the
County faces the risk the"iury.will compensate her for an amount greater than the true market
value of her property. As we explain we conclude the preferable approach is the one
recommended by Bressi. Bressi, 229 Ca1.Rptr. at 49; 184 CalApp.3d at 121.

-

-

The Court then discussed the CaliforniaConstitution,which provides forjust compensation,
as well as California statutes which require the condemnor to enter a resolution of necessity which
conclusively defines the taking. The Court held: "The County may not, however, introduce evidence
which purports to limit the taking by contradicting the resolution itself." Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. at

The Bressi case is closely analogous to the case at hand. ACHD's Order of Condemnation
takes all access to Eagle Road other than the residential access depicted on the project plans. ACHD
should not be allowed to claim that it is not taking access when that claim clearly contradicts the
plain language of its own Order, yet that is what the Court of Appeals has allowed them to do.
Additional California authority which supports Appellant's position can be found in The
People ex rel. Department ofPublic Works v. Sckultz Company, 123 Cal.App.2d 925,268 P.2d 117
(1954), and Coachella Valley Water District v. Western Allied Properties, 235 Cal.Rptr. 725, 190
Cal.App.3d 969 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1987).
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D. The Court of Appeals has declined to follow or even discuss and reject the body of case law from
other iurisdictions which is directly on point on this issue. dismissing the decisions from other
jurisdictions with a passing; comment
In Footnote two of the Court of Appeals opinion reads in part: "While these cases may be
somewhat instructive, each state has developed its own individualized body of statutory and
decisional law on this topic which appear to be state specific or otherwise distinguishable."
Appellant Sharp provided the Court of Appeals with more than thirty (30) citations to
decisions from other jurisdictions which were directly on point and supported the Appellant's
position.53 The Court of Appeals declined to even discuss the reasoning or the rationale of a single
53

Application of City of Great Bend, Kansas, 869 P.2d 587,254 Kan. 699 (1994); Atkinson v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 121 S.E.2d 743,239 S.C. 150 (1961); Barcus v. City ofKansas City, 661 P.2d 806,s
Kan.App2d 506 (1983); Carolina Cenlral Gas Company v. Hyder, 241 N.C. 639,86 S.E.2d 458 (1955); Chester
Litho, Inc. v. Palisades Inter. Park Com 'n, 27 N.Y.2d 323,266 N.E.2d 229,317 N.Y.2d 761 (1971); Consolidated
Gas Supply Corp. v. Reilly, 414 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1979); Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay et al., 159 Or. 272,79 P.2d
672 (1938); County ofSan Diego v. M a v E. Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. 44, 184 Cal.App.3d 112 (1986); Danish
Vennerforning and Old Peoples Home v. State of Nebraska, Department of Roads, 191 Neb. 774,2 17 N.W.2d 8 19
(1974); East Bay Utility Municipal Utility Dist. v. City ofLodi et al., 120 Cal.App. 740,s P.2d 532 (1932); Gable V.
State ofNebraska Department of Roads, 176 Neb. 789, 127 N.W.2d 475 (1964); Hickey v. Town ofBurrillville et
al., 713 A.2d 781 (R.I. 1998); Hudson v. City ofShawnee,246 Kan. 395,790 P.2d 903 (1990); Idaho-Western Ry.
CO.V. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Luthern Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568,119 P. 60 (191 1); Kahlen V.
State, 223 N.Y. 383,119 N.E. 883 (1918); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Warren v. Flanders, 461 A.2d 927 (R.I.
1983); Larsen v. Village ofLava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64,396 P.2d 471 (1964); Levcowich v. Town of Westerly,
492 A.2d 141 (R.I. 1985); Little et al. v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 864,36 N.W.2d 261 (1949);
Louisville & N. Ry. Co. et. al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. oflndiana, 111 N.E. 802, 184 I~ld.531 (1916);
North Carolina State Highway et al. v. Black et al., 239 N.C. 198,79 S.E.2d 778 (1 954); Northwest Quadrant Pure
Waters District No. 1 v. Payne Beach Association, Inc., et al., 38 A.D.2d 668,327 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1971); Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority v Burk, 1966 OK 113,415 P.2d 1001 (1966); Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80
Idaho 105,326 P.2d 388 (1958); Peebles v. Canal Authority, 254 So2d 232 (1971); The People ex rel. Department
of Public Works v. Schultz Company, 123 Cal.App.2d 925,268 P.2d 117 (1954); Perkins et ux. v. State, 150 S.W.2d
157 (1941); Portneuf-Marsh Etc. Co. v. PortneufIrr. Co., 19 Idaho 483,114 P. 19 (191 1); Rawson- Works Lumber
CO.v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P. 74 (1914); Richardson v. Big Indian Creek Watershed Conservancy District
of Gage andJefferson Counties, 181 Neb. 776, 151 N.W.2d 283 (1967); Reisenauer v. Staie ofldaho, 120 Idaho
36,813 P.2d 375 (Idaho App. 1991); Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Cl'atershedJoint District No. 24,392 P.2d 914,
193 Kan. 151 (1964); Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46,867 P.2d 920 (1993); Shell Pipe Line Corporation v.
Woolfolket al., 331 Mo. 410,53 S.W.2d 917 (1932); St. Patrick's Church., Whilney Point v. State, 30 A.D.2d 473,
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one of those decisions and have instead concluded, without explaining their reasoning, that Idaho
is unique among all the states to ever consider the issues presented in this appeal.
The overwhelming majority of case law on the issues in this appeal supports the Appellant's
position. See generally Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rdEdition, Chapter IB, Determining the
Properly Rights Acquired and Dealing With Modifications or Attempted Modifications to the
Taking. The Respondent, Ada County Highway District, did not cite a single decision from any
jurisdiction which supports its position in this case, nor did the Court of Appeals cite to any decision
from any other jurisdiction to support its holding.
Other jurisdictions have procedures which are very similar to the procedures in Idaho. The
cases cited by Appellant in support of her position were from a variety of jurisdictions. The
similarity between the condemnation procedures used in those states and Idaho's procedure is
blatantly evident from a review of the statutes in those states.54

294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968); State v. Smith, 25 Wash.2d 540, 171 P.2d 853 (1946); State ex rel. Polson Logging CO. v.
Superior Courtfor Grays Harbor County et al., 11Wash.2d 545, 119 P.2d 694 (1941); State of Missouri ex rel.
State Highway Commission v. Johnson et al., 287 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1956); Sullivan v. Marcello, Director of Public
Works, 100 R.I. 241,214 A.2d 181 (1965); Vallone v. City of Cranston, Department of Public Works (two cases),
97 R.I. 248, 197 A.2d 310 (1964); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Webb et al., 196 Va. 555,84 S.E.2d 735
(1954); Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682 (191 1); White v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. ofAmerica, 444 S.W.2d 298 (1969); WoIfe v. State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292,239 N.E.2d 517,292
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1968).
54

See California - Cal. Code $1240.040 Resolution of necessity; Florida- Fla. Stat. ch. 73.021 Petition;
contents; Indiana - Ind. Code $3 1-1 1-1-2. Condemnation proceedings -Parties- Complaint- Contents- Venue.;
Kansas - Kan. Stat. Ann $26-501 Contents of petition.; Missouri- Mo.Rev.Stat. $523.010 Lands may be
condemned, when- petition-parties- power of public utility to condemn certain lands, limitations; Nebraska - Neb.
Rev. Stat. 576-701.01 Petition of condemner; contents.; New York- Em. Dom. Proc. 5402 Filing of acquisition
maps; vesting; North Carolina - N.C. Gen. Stat. 540A-41. Institution of action and deposit; Oklahoma- Okla. Stat.
tit. 27 5 2 Condemnation procedure for state lands; Oregon - Or. Rev. Stat. 9 35.265 (1997) Commencement of
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California's procedure is somewhat different in that the statutes require that an Order of
Condemnation (known as a Resolution ofNecessity) be adopted, and proscribe the contents of the
Resolution. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1245.210-1245.270. InIdaho there is animplied requirement
that an Order of Condemnation be issued rather than a statutory requirement. LC. $40-13 lO(3).
However, this does not mean that cases decided by the California courts do not contain instructive
reasoning and helpful analysis in dealing with this issue.
The Court of Appeals chose to ignore all of the cases cited by Appellant, including those
from states with nearly identical condemnation statutes and procedures.
Even assuming that Idaho were completely unique in its taw of eminent domain and wholly
different from the other jurisdictions to consider this issue, the reasoning and rationale of the courts
which have considered cases on this issue is applicable. If that reasoning is rejected by the Idaho
Courts, it would be helpful to both condemnors and condemnees in the State of Idaho to have clear
guidance that the rationale applied in other jurisdictions does not apply in our State, and why.

E. The Court of Ap~ealshas issued a decision on a substantive legal issue of first impression not
heretofore determined bv the Supreme Court: which will have broad implications for evely
governmental agencv and utility in Idaho that has been authorized to condemn real vropertv for
public purposes, as well as every owner of private propem who will face condemnation
There is no Idaho decision prior to the Court of Appeals decision in this case which addresses
the meaning or effect of orders of condemnation. The Court of Appeals has held that Orders of

action; jurisdiction; Or. Rev. Stat. 5 35.255 (1997) Content of complaint; Rhode Island - R.I. Gen. Law $37-6-14.
Filing of condemnation papers- Vesting of title- Availability of state treasury funds.; Texas- Tex.Code Ann.
$21.0 12 Condemnation petition.; Washiion- Wash. Rev. Code $8.01.010 Petition for appropriation- Contents.
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Condemnation, which purport to define the scope of the taking, do not in fact do so:
The [trial] court concluded that the order of condemnation was not determinativeto defining
the scope of the take. For the reasons stated above, we agree as a matter of law and affirm
the district court's subsequent ruling that Sharp's access rights were not altered by ACHD's
actions. (Court of Appeals decision, page 5.)
The Order of Condemnation is signed by all the ACHD Commissioners and authorizes a
condemnationaction to proceed. Under the Court of Appeals decision, the condemnation Complaint
subsequently filed can reflect wholly different property and property rights to be acquired, with no
authorization from the condemnor and no amending order or resolution. Yet, pursuant to I.C. 3 40-

An order of the highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the land sought
to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima facia
evidence of that fact.
The curious result is that the Order establishes public use and necessity but does not establish the
scope ofthe take. The Court of Appeals does not explain why the Order is effective in some respects
and ineffective in others, nor can any condemnee reasonably be expected to make such a distinction.
F. The Court of Ameats has aplied the Supreme Court's decision in Rueth v. State. which was an
inverse condemnation case, to the facts of a direct condemnation case, which represents an extension
of the Supreme Court's holding in Rueth which has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court
There is a significant difference between direct and inverse condemnation cases. While both
stem from the power to take private property for public use, in a direct condemnation case the
acquiring agency (condemnor) is admitting that they are taking private property. The condemnor in
a direct case alleges that the taking of private property is necessary for a public use and defines the
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property and property rights to be acquired, prior to the Court of Appeals decision in this case.
In contrast, in an inverse condemnation case, the condemnor denies that it is taking property.
The property owner alleges that a taking of private property has occurred, either because there has
been a physical invasion of the owner's private property, or because there has been excessive
government regulation of the property, or because unreasonable conditions have been placed on the
property owner as conditions of development of the property (exactions).
There is a distinct body of law for direct condemnation cases and a separate and distinct body
of law for inverse condemnation cases. While the rules regarding valuation issues are the same in
both types of cases, all of the procedural rules are different because the processes are so different.
In addition, there are several sub-sections of law in inverse cases - physical takings, exactions and
regulatory takings.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is an indication that the Court did not understand
the unique issues and complexities involved in condemnation. Condemnation cases are unique in
the law. The Court's application of inverse condemnation case law in a direct condemnation case
when the issue is not one of valuation reflects a lack of familiarity with this area of the law.
The Court of Appeals decision reads as follows on pages 5 and 6 :
In Reuth v State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978), the Idaho
Supreme Court discussed the role of trial courts in condemnatiori proceedings:
The trial court will make the determination of the taking issues which will be
reflected, as in California, in instructions which advise the jury that there has
been a taking, and the nature of the property right taken where the court
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concludes that the taking is less than a fee. Additionally, and as appears to
be the practice in California, it is desirable that the trial court enter findings
and conclusions pertinent to that issue, and pertinent to any issue other than
that ofjust compensation.
(Emphasis added.) Sharp asserts on appeal that Rueth is inapplicable because it was an
inverse condemnation case. However, the Reutk Court approvingly cited Brock v. Stale
Highway Commission, 404 P.2d 934, 940 (Kan. 1965), and quoted: "As in any other
condemnation case, in context and in its entirety, simply defines the access that is available
to the Sharp property exactly as it exists."
The district court in this case looked at all ofthe evidence, especiallythe language of ACHD's
complaint, and determined that no access was being condemned because Sharp's rights of
access to ~ a ~~ lo ea were
d unchanged by the ACEID'S actions. The court concluded that the
order of condemnation was not determinative to defining the scope of the take. For the
reasons stated above, we agree as a matter of law and affirm the district court's subsequent
ruling that Sharp's access rights were not altered by ACHD's actions.
First, both California and Kansas cases which are direct condemnation cases clearly support
Appellant's position on appeal, as discussed previously herein. Second, the Reutk inverse case cited
approvingly to Brock, which was also an inverse case.
Third, the Court of Appeals in this portion of its decision ignores the fact that the trial court
found there was no change in Sharp's physical, existing residential driveway access, and that future
legal rights of access may or may not be present. There is a difference between physical and legal
access.55 Although Sharp's physical residential access remained in place, the plain language of

5s

See e.g. MacBean v. St. Paul Title Insurance, 169 N.J.Super. 502,405 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1979); Hocking
v Title Insurance & Trust Co., 37 Cal.2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (195 1); Krause v. Title & Trust Co., 390 So.2d 805
fFla.App. 5 Dist. 1980); Gales v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 813 S.W.2d 10 (Miss. 1991); Title & Trust Co.
v. Barrows, 381 So.2d 1088 (1979). These cases are title insurance cases that have addressed the specific issue of
legal VS. physical access and have all found the two are separate and distinct.
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ACRD's Order of Condemnation presently condemned all legal access rights to andfrom her

property other than the narrow, existing access which it was undisputed cannot be used in the
development ofthe property as ofthe date of taking.
G. The Court of A~aealsDid Not Address the Critical Issue Presented on Appeal
The first and primary issue presented on appeal was as follows:

1. Is the ACHD bound by its official Order of Condemnation, which unambiguously states
that all access to and from Eagle Road and the Sharp property was permanently taken, except
for the access provided in the project plans?
The Court of Appeals, rather than addressing that issue, re-defined it as follows:
The issue of whether a civil complaint of condemnation supercedes an administrative order
of the highway district commissioners, for purposes of determining what property interest is
being condemned, is one of first impression in Idaho and involves a question of statutoly
interpretation.
In re-defining the issue in this way, the Court of Appeals presumed, but did.not discuss, that there was
a conflict in this case between the complaint and the administrative order of the highway district. In
fact, the order of condemnation was attached to the complaint as an exhibit and there is nothing in
the complaint which is inconsistent with the order. The Complaint did not describe access as being
taken, but it included the order of condemnation which diddescribe that all rights of access other than
those depicted in the project plans were being taken. The Complaint did not state that access rights,
as described in the order with the other property and property rights to be acquired, were not being
taken. Therefore, the Complaint could be construed as taking access.
The Court treated the issue on appeal as though it were a question of statutory impression
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW - 32

construing LC. Section 7-707 and I.C. Section 40-1310(3):
Idaho Code Section 7-707, appearing in chapter 7 entitled "Eminent Domain," pertains
to the condemnation complaint and sets forth what it "must contain," including "a description
of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or only a
part, of an entire parcel or tract." Idaho Code Section 40-1310(3), appearing in a chapter
entitled "Highway Districts," provides that the director of the highway district: "shall have the
right, subject to the order of the highway district commissioners, to begin action in the
highway district in the district court of the county in which the district is situated, to condemn
the land necessary for the right of way for the highway, under the provisions of chapter 7, title
7, Idaho Code," whenever the director cannot agree with any person for the purchase of the
land. This section m h e r provides: "An order of the highway district commissioners entered
upon its minutes that the land sought to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and
public use shall be prima facia evidence of that fact. Neither of these code sections purport
to state whether it is the order of condemnation or the complaint initiating the eminent domain
action that is determinative in defining what land or what rights are sought to be condemned.
It is this Court's opinion, however, that I.C. Section 7-707 is more specific, and, perforce,
controlling.
Idaho Code Section 7-707 requires that the land sought to be condemned be
speciiically described in the complain, whereas I.C. Section 40-1310(3) only states that an
order of condemnation enteredupon the commissioners' minutes will beprimafacia evidence
of public use. While LC. Section 40-1310(3) requires that such an order refer to the land
sought to be condemned, it does not require a specific description of the land, as does I.C.
Section 7-707. Furthermore, LC. Section 7-707, on the other hand, specifically anticipates
that the complaint will be filed with a district court and thus published to and served upon the
landowner.
In defining the issue this way, the Court of Appeals failed to consider two important aspects
of the issue presented on appeal. First, the issue on appeal was whether or not the highway district
is bound by its order of condemnation, not whether it was bound by its complaint. The difference is
significant because the order of condemnation is the means by which the condemning authority acts,
much like a corporate resolution. The order of condemnation is the instrument which officially
authorizes the taking and which defines the rights to be acquired. The issue on appeal was whether
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or not such a resolution binds the condemnor, as a corporate resolution would bind the corporation.
In this case, the condemning authority never entered a subsequent resolution amending its original
order and redefining the taking. Therefore, if the order of condemnation is binding on the condemnor,
attempts to take property and property rights other than those described in the order would be
essentially ulta vires, as there would be no authority from the government agency/condemnor to
deviate from its official order.
The complaint is a document drafted by attorneys for the condemning agency, which is
supposed to effectuate the taking of the property rights the condemning agency has officially
determined, via its order of condemnation, that it desires to acquire. Absent some official direction
to the contrary, the complaint should therefore seek to acquire the property and property rights
described in the order of condemnation. In this case, the complaint attached the order of
condemnation and ACHD never entered a subsequent order or an alternative direction to acquire
different rights than those described in the complaint. Even at the court trial in this matter ACHD
representative Larry Sale testified that the effect of the language in the order may be to take access
from the Sharp property.
Second, the issue presented on appeal called upon the Court to determine whether ACHD was
bound by its order of condemnation. By failing to address this issue and hold either "yes" or "no,"
there is an unanswered question regarding the effect of orders of condemnation in instances where
a lawsuit is not filed. For example, what happens when ACHD or another government agency
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determines that negotiation with a property owner has failed and enters an order of condemnation,
only to then settle with the owner prior to a lawsuit being filed? If the owner relies on the order of
condemnation and the rights described therein as having been acquired, can the condemnor re-define
the rights acquired and claim that its own order of condemnation is mere form language and not to
be relied upon? Certainly the Court of Appeals decision gives ACHD an argument that its orders of
condemnation are not binding and are simply internal documents not to be relied upon by others.
Every other condemnor could make the same argument.
Another consequence of the Court of Appeals re-definition of the issue is that it fails to
consider the practical realities involved in the way government agencies use their orders of
condemnation. For example, assume that an order of condemnation is entered, a complaint is filed,
a judgment is entered, and the condemnation case concludes. A year later the property owner goes
into ACHD to apply for a development application. ACHD of course has on file the order of
condemnation relating to that property, which states that all access has been taken, and can use that
language as a basis for denying access to the owner, claiming that the access was condemned. Unless
the judgment entered in the condemnation case is also on file at ACHD and clearly states that the
order of condemnation does not have any effect or that access is not taken, what is to prevent ACHD
from using its orders in this way? In fact, there is evidence in the record, in the Offer of Proof,
Affidavit of Pat Dobie, that the Idaho Transportation Department uses orders of condemnation in
exactly that way.
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The practical reality is that condemnors keep their own orders on file, and may or may not
keep complaints and judgments on file. The orders of condemnation are used by the condemning
agency to determine what rights have been acquired, not complaints or judgments. Therefore,
condemning agencies use the language of their instruments to bind property owners, yet when
property owners seek damages based on the language of those orders in condemnation proceedings,
the condemnor is allowed to escape the language of its orders pursuant to the Court of Appeals
decision in this case. This result is inequitable and warrants review.
H. The Court of A~pealsdecision contains statements which are not based on any information in the
record and which does not accurately reflect the facts of what transpired in this case
There are portions of the Court of Appeals decision which are not based on the facts in the
record and do not accurately reflect what transpired in this case. Footnote three reads:
From this point on, communication between the parties broke down, witheachparty assuming
its current position was understood bv the other. Sharp thereaftex spent thousands of dollars
hiring experts to value her property, based on her erroneous assunlption that all of her future
rights of access were being condemned by the ACHD. This caused each party to find the
other's offer of settlement unreasonable. Much of this dispute could have been avoided with
a simple phone call to clarify the matter of future access to Eagle Road.
The "erroneous assumption" made by Sharp, according to the Court of Appeals, was that
access was being taken. However, as the facts in the record clearly establish, Sharp had been advised
by ACHD's Chief Right of Way negotiator that her access rights were being condemned, and that
although she could continue to use her existing residential driveways for the time being, her access
was being taken for the project. ACHD's Order of Condemnation unambiguously and clearly stated
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that all access rights were being taken. Nothing disclosed in discovery ever indicated that access was
not, in fact, being taken. In fact, ACHD never took the position that its Order of Condemnation did

not inf act take access until oral argument in rebuttal to Sharp S closing argument at the close of the
Court Trial in this matter. Even during the Court Trial, when Lany Sale (ACHD employee) was on
the stand and the Order of Condemnation was admitted into evidence and discussed with Mr. Sale,

AClTD offeered no evidence that the Order of Condemnation did not in,fact take access.
Given the fact that ACHD represented throughout the entire case and even through the entire
Court Trial, until rebuttal argument, that access was being taken by the Order of Condemnation, it is
unreasonable to expect that Sharp's counsel should have called ACHD to ask whether or not they
really meant what they were saying. The practical reality is that in a condemnation case the
condemnee relies on the government's definition of the taking. Here, Sharp and her lawyers did that,
only to be told by the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that this was unreasonable, unfourtunate
behavior which "could have been avoided."
The record in this matter establishes that the dispute could have been avoided if ACHD had
been willing to live with its language in its official Order of Condemnation defining the rights to be
acquired, or, if ACHD had determined that diferent rights were to be acquired, ACHD should have
clearly stated that in its Complaint, instead of attaching the Order of Condemnation to the Complaint
and failing to state that ACHD did not wish to be bound by its terms. ACHD has the obligation to
define the taking and ascertain just compensation, not the property owner. In this case the owner
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relied on ACHD's representations regarding the taking of access. When ACHD learned how much
access rights would cost, it suddenly took the abrupt change in position that it did not want the access
rights and was not seeking to acquire them. ACHD argued that its own documents to the contrary,
the Right of Way Agent's memo and the official Order of Condemnation, were meaningless and of
no effect. Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals sanctioned this argument.
In addition, the Court of Appeals decision, page 6, reads:
Sharp contends that based upon ACHD's order of condemnation, she reasonably believed
that ACHD sought to condemn allfuture rights of access to Eagle Road from her remailling
property.
That was not Sharp's contention. It was ACHD"s argument that if any rights of access were acquired,
they were only future access rights. Sharp's contention was that the plain, unambiguous language of
the Order of Condemnation took, as of the date of summons in this case, all access rights to Sharp's
remaining property. The Order said:

7. That all rights of access to. from. and between the right-of-way of the vublic wav and all
shall be
of the contirmous remaining real provemi of the named owners. or erpextinguished and orohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described.
It was undisputed that the only access in the project plans showed two substandard residential
driveways which could not serve any use of the property other than its current residential use. It was
also undisputed that as of the date of summons and valuation, the highest and best use of the Sharp
property was commercial, not residential. Therefore, anyone valuing the property as of the date of
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taking (the date of summons), would value the property in the after condition assuming all access
rights to Eagle road had been taken as the Order of Condemnation plainly stated. There is no legal
or factual basis for assigning a temporal "future" concept to the access rights acquired. Nothing in
the record supports that future, as opposed to present, access rights were acquired.
The Court of Appeals stated on page 7 of its decision:
The district court in this case looked at all of the evidence, especially the language of ACHD's
complaint, and determined that no access was being condemned because Sharp's rights of
access to Eagle Road were unchanged by the ACHD's actions.
In fact, as supported by the Record, Judge McKee did not "especially [consider] the language of
ACHD's complaint." ACHD never even made the argument that the complaint rather than the Order
of Condemnation was controlling until the Motion for Reconsideration, months afler the Court Trial
and after this Court had denied Sharp's motion seeking permission for an interlocutory appeal. The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge McKee make

Q.Q

reference to the

complaint. (R., pgs. 98 - 106). McKee decided the Order of Condemnation was "irrelevant" and
"ambiguous," not that the Complaint controlled.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals did not decide this case on the facts presented in the record. In addition,
the Court of Appeals did not discuss any of the authority from other jurisdictions which supports
Appellant Sharp's position, and which is the majority rule. The Court of Appeals did not cite a single
case from any other jurisdiction which supports the position it has taken and judicially legislated a
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new rule. In fact the only case the Court of Appeals cited at all is Reuth v. State, which is an inverse
condemnation case. Upon closer review, the authorities cited approvingly in the Reuth case support
Appellant's position herein.
There is an overwhelming amount of solid legal authority cited by Appellant Sharp which
supports her position in this appeal. The Court of Appeals declined to even discuss or d i s t i n ~ i s any
h
of the cases cited. The Court of Appeals has determined that Idaho is unique among all states in the
area of condemnation, without so much as mention of any review of the statutes from other
jurisdictions (which, in fact, are for the most part similar to Idaho's statutes).
The Court of Appeals decision will have broad implications to both condemnors and property
owners. It allows the trial court in condemnation cases to have the ultimate decision regarding what
property rights the condemnor is acquiring and for which it must pay. The decision has extreme
negative consequencesto bothcondemnors and condemneesand therefore warrants review by Idaho's
highest Court.
Sharp respectfully asks this Court to accept her Petition for Review in this matter.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2001.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

HEATHER A. CUNNINGH&,
Attorneys for Appellant
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